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Abstract This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention
allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-haz-
ard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting
the principal choose the amount of monitoring allocated across tasks. In our model,
more attention allocated to a task improves the task contractibility and consequently
increases the effort provided by the agent. Our findings show that, even under sym-
metry, in the presence of increasing returns to scale in either production or monitoring
the principal may optimally offer an unbalanced incentive contract while allocating
different amounts of attention across tasks. Finally, we comment on the empirical
content of our model.
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1 Introduction
To this day, there is an extensive literature in economics that focuses on the study
of contract theory and the principal-agent problem. Most of these papers start off by
assuming the presence of a principal that hires an agent to undertake a certain action
which is not perfectly observable. For this reason, the agent may not exert enough
effort to take the action under fixed-wage contract due to moral hazard. On the other
hand, under variable compensation she may be reluctant to exert the costly effort
if she is concerned that she may not be rewarded due to the less-than-perfect action
observability. The principal takes into account these factors and designs a contract that
aligns the interests of the agent with those of their own. The optimal contract will pro-
vide stronger incentives the more observable the actions are and the lower the agent’s
degree of risk aversion. These predictions were first formalized by Holmstrom (1979)
and Shavell (1979) for the case of one-task jobs and by Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) in the case of jobs with many tasks. In these papers and most of the previous
literature, the main role of the principal is to design an optimal incentive contract for
the agent while taking the contractibility of actions as given.1 In this paper we extend
the existing framework from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and (1994) to allow
for endogenous task contractibility as we introduce the role of attention allocation
constraint in incentive contracts. The goal of this paper is then to derive the optimal
incentive contracts in a setting where the principal shapes the contracting environment
by simultaneously choosing monitoring intensity and designing the incentive contract
that she will offer to the agent.
For this purpose, in this paper we build upon the multi-tasking contracting scenario
in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and (1994) by introducing an attention allocation
constraint on the principal/manager side. The model presents a risk-neutral principal
contractingwith a risk-averse agent over effort in two different tasks. The agent’s effort
is not perfectly observable and thus the moral hazard problem. We introduce to the
classic contracting problem an attention constraint for the manager. The principal is
endowed with a monitoring capacity that must be allocated among all tasks that define
the job. This monitoring capacity can adopt the form of investment in monitoring
technology or actual time spent by the manager monitoring and watching employees.
The problem of the manager then becomes how much of the attention capacity to
allocate to each task. More attention allocated to a given task increases the precision
(decreases the uncertainty) of pay for performance measures in the given task used
by the principal in the incentive contract, and therefore mitigates the moral hazard
problem. Since the principal is constrained on the total level of attention that she can
allocate among all tasks, she faces a trade-off on effort measurability across tasks. In
other words, in this paper the principal’s monitoring decisions are endogenous and that
affects the contractibility of the tasks that define the job. This differs from previous
research in that typically the monitoring decisions of the principal are implicitly taken
as given and exogenously changed to analyze comparative statics off the equilibrium.
1 Some papers (such as Lucas 1978) have allowed the principal to take costly actions that enhance the
profitability of the agent’s actions.
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We solve the model through backward induction where the only difference with
the regular model is that in the first period the principal chooses the allocation of her
attention endowment across all tasks. Our solution generates two main results that
we describe next. We first examine the reaction of the agent to incentives and show
consistent results with the previous literature. An increase in the attention allocated
to one task leads to a decrease in the uncertainty of the pay for performance measure
and an increase in the contractibility of that task. As a consequence, the agent will
increase the effort exerted in that task due to the decrease in the uncertainty of the
pay for performance measure. This comes as no surprise since the innovation in our
paper comes from the principal side and we leave unchanged the agent side relative to
other papers. This result also shows that a strong complementarity between attention
allocation and incentive provision emerges endogenously within the model.
This strong complementarity between incentive provision and monitoring intensity
is endogenous in our model and is at odds with conventional results from Hennart
(1993) where managers may decide to monitor some tasks and provide incentive con-
tracts for others. Our results show that in particular cases of a multi-task setting these
tools are complementary (instead of substitutes).
Once established the link between managerial attention and the effort of the agent,
our second set of results follows. Our model allows us to investigate how the manager
allocates the monitoring capacity across tasks under different circumstances and how
she optimally coordinates incentive provision across tasks within a contract and the
allocation of her attention endowment. For this purpose, we compare results under
different technologies in production and monitoring. We find that the principal will
optimally allocate the same level of managerial attention and provide the same incen-
tives across tasks whenwe impose symmetric decreasing returns to scale in production
and monitoring. Not surprisingly, the principal or manager will also choose an asym-
metric allocation of attentionwhen there is an asymmetry in themonitoring technology
or in the contribution to profits of each task. However, even in the case of symmetric
technologies across tasks, there may be an optimal asymmetric attention allocation
and incentive provision across tasks when there are increasing returns to scale to either
production or monitoring.
To the best of our knowledge, the framework and results in this paper are a contri-
bution to this literature for a variety of reasons. On the content side of the paper, we
believe it provides a more realistic view of the manager’s role in agency relationships
by showing howmanagers interact and combine incentive contracts with monitoring.2
To our knowledge, two papers are closest to ours. Demougin and Fluet (2001) exam-
ine the trade-off between incentives and monitoring within a firm cost minimization
problem. Consistent with our results, they find that incentives and monitoring may
be complementary under certain circumstances. Their approach differs from ours in
that their monitoring technology helps repairing the agent’s mistakes within a pois-
son technology and ours focuses on the standard moral hazard problem introduced
2 Our definition of the monitoring technologymay be too narrow.Mainly the problem presented here estab-
lishes the fact that the principal/manager is constraint on howmuchmonitoring she can undertake. Therefore
the total capacity of attention may take the form of time, money investment or monitoring technology or
personel that can be distributed among all tasks of production.
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in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). The second paper close to ours is Khalil and
Lawarree (1995) where they show that there is a complementarity between monitor-
ing type (input versus output monitoring) and incentive provision. Other papers have
also examined similar topics. A few examples are MacDonald and Marx (2001) who
highlight the importance of complementarities between task composition and incentive
contracts taking the contractibility of effort as exogenous; Kessler (2004) where man-
agers are allowed to optimize between quantity and quality of monitoring; or Lazear
(2006) who also shows that attention allocation by the principal may lead agents to
particularly focus on certain aspects of the tasks they perform and in response to that
the principal may choose to focus on specific tasks. On the other hand, this paper
represents the first application of the ideas of the inattentiveness literature started
off by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003) and (2006) to optimal incentive
contracts.
Finally, on the empirical content of the model, our findings sheds light on possible
biases on estimates offered by previous papers as up to now the empirical literature has
not taken into account differences in monitoring technologies across firms and jobs.
We discuss the implications of the absence of such controls and guide future research
characterizing the ideal data set that will allow testing the predictions of our model
(as opposed to those of others) easier. Our model displays a complementarity between
incentives and attention and therefore the main empirical implication is that managers
choose to provide higher incentives in those tasks that they simultaneously choose to
monitor more closely. More specifically, it becomes key for researchers and econome-
tricians to observe investments in monitoring along with incentive provision. When a
shock occurs that causes the managers to redesign their incentive contracts we should
observe a positive correlation between incentives and monitoring within tasks and a
negative correlation between incentives and monitoring across tasks within a contract
due to the attention allocation constraint. On the other hand, when managers are able
to increase their attention constraint, we should observe an increase in monitoring and
incentives across all tasks.
Unfortunately, prior literature in empirical contracting contains no evidence inmon-
itoring intensities and therefore we find limited direct evidence at the moment that
confirms the testable implications from our model. Hueth et al. (1999) is a rare excep-
tion that shows a positive correlation between incentive provision and monitoring in
contracts between growers and first handlers in California fruit and vegetable markets.
Other papers provide indirect evidence consistent with our implications. Baker and
Hubbard (2003) document the impact of an exogenous change in monitoring costs
due to the introduction of on-board computers in the trucking industry. Lower mon-
itoring costs increased the amount of monitoring by trucking companies and the use
of outsourcing (as opposed to in-house contracting) in shipping services.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to the relevant
preceding literature. Section 3 presents and solves the model under symmetric task
technologies. This section shows how the introduction of managerial attention allo-
cation shapes the design of optimal incentive contracts. In Sect. 4, we consider the
introduction of asymmetries between tasks and we obtain that results do not change
qualitatively. We also extend our model in Sect. 5 by adding complementarities in
production across tasks. Finally, Sect. 6 discusses the empirical content of our model
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and comments on existing supporting evidence in the empirical contracting literature
and Sect. 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
This paper builds on and contributes directly to two different economic literatures.
These are the literature on optimal incentive contracts and its recent stream of papers
departing from the standard rationality assumptions, and the literature on attention
allocation that has been mainly developed in macroeconomics and only now recently
applied to other fields in economics.
2.1 Literature on optimal incentive contracts
The literature on optimal incentive contracts is extensive and confronts many and very
different types of information asymmetries. Here we review the literature on incentive
contracts dealing with moral hazard issues and risk aversion. Among the first con-
tributors to this literature are Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) who studied the
case of one-dimensional effort problems, and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) who
extended the literature by examining multi-dimensional effort problems. The former
papers established the optimality of the negative relationship between uncertainty and
incentive intensity while the latter emphasized the necessity of balancing incentives
across tasks and the importance of job design. Following this literature, others have
studied the distortion of performance measures in incentive contracts (Baker 1992) or
the role of subjective pay for performance (Baker et al. 1994) in the optimal design of
incentive contracts. Yetmost studies take the contractibility of effort as given assuming
an uncertainty variance–covariance matrix .
In this paper, we introduce a managerial attention allocation constraint and relax
the agent’s effort constraint by assuming a convex disutility of effort. This novelty
allows us to endogeneize the up-to-now exogenous variance-covariance matrix and
therefore explore how the manager balances the use of incentives and attention across
tasks. Other papers before ours have modelled the endogenous decision of monitoring
(Demougin and Fluet 2001; Khalil and Lawarree 1995; MacDonald and Marx 2001;
Kessler 2004), but in our model monitoring decisions do not enter directly the prin-
cipal’s profit function and yet mitigate the moral hazard problem in a multi-tasking
setting. A direct consequence of this novelty of our approach is that managers may
decide to mute incentives in one task and concentrate their attention and incentive pro-
vision into another task. There are other papers that document cases where a principal
optimally chooses leaving a task outside a formal contract and therefore choosing the
degree of contractual completeness (see Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Corts 2007
regarding job design and Hart and Moore 2004 or Wernerfelt 2007 for endogenous
contractual completeness among others). Our approach here differs from those in that
our principal faces a trade-off between decreasing the contractibility of a task and
increasing the contractibility of another task and therefore we are very precise about
the nature of the cost incurred by the principal.
This paper also contributes to a recent stream of papers that has introduced into the
analysis of optimal contracting new elements that depart from traditional rationality
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assumptions. See recent examples of this literature in Hart and Moore (2008) bring-
ing entitleness into bargaining or Fehr and others3 examining the consequences of
inequity aversion or reciprocity in optimal incentive contracts. Our paper differs from
these in that managers in our framework are self-interested but instead of working
around the contractibility shortcomings we allow for an endogenous solution to the
degree of effort contractibility.
2.2 Literature on attention allocation
This paper is not the first to apply inattentiveness in economics, but it is, to the best
of our knowledge, among the first papers to examine the role of inattentiveness in
contracting while endogeneizing the degree of effort contractibility within a standard
moral hazard model. Gifford (2004) derives a model of make-or-buy decisions and
endogenous transaction costs with attention allocation. Her paper follows the trans-
action cost economics approach to explaining make-or-buy decisions and therefore
assumes that contractual incompleteness of tasks performed inside the firm are unim-
portant since all distortions can be taken care of within the firm. Our approach here
differs from hers in that the source of contract distortion (i.e., moral hazard) remains
inside the firm and we examine the role of attention allocation in dealing with employ-
ment contracts within a firm.
This paper also relates to the recent literature on attention allocation and inat-
tentiveness. Inattentive agents have been used in several fields. In macroeconomics,
inattention has explained sticky prices inMankiw and Reis (2002) andMackoviak and
Wiederholt (2007) and consumption dynamics in Reis (2006a,b) and Luo (2007). In
finance, attention allocationdecisions havebeenused to understandfinancial contagion
across emerging economies in Mondria (2006) and portfolio under-diversification in
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007a). In international finance, inattentive inves-
tors help explain the forward discount puzzle in Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006)
and the home bias puzzle in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2007b).
Despite the novelty of our approach, we recognize that previous research has char-
acterized the main role of the principal as one of allocating resources across workers
or tasks or even choosing the optimal number of workers being managed by one sole
manager. Lucas (1978) shows that higher skill workers are more likely to become
managers and are more likely to manage bigger firms. His result speaks about the
distribution of firm sizes in the economy, but does not focus into the attention alloca-
tion constraint of the managers. Similarly, Rosen (1982) examines the allocation of
talent within the hierarchy of a firm and across firms within the economy. He shows
how more skilled managers should be solving more important problems and therefore
located in higher up positions in the hierarchy of bigger firms. His result also focuses
on the distribution of the size of firms and the distribution of earnings in the economy.
For both these papers (and the literature that followed) higher skilled managers are
allocated to more important problems to maximize revenues and therefore the same
principle that drives the introduction of attention allocation is at use. Our approach
3 See Fehr and Schmidt (2003), Fehr et al. (2007), and Englmaier and Wambach (2007) among others.
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differs from all these in that in our paper attention allocation helps monitoring tasks
and increases the contractibility of effort exerted on a given task by increasing the
precision of the effort on that task.
3 The model
In this section we present our model as an extension to the framework in Holmstrom
(1979) and Holmstrom andMilgrom (1991). This model presents a principal contract-
ing over the non-contractible multidimensional effort of an agent. The agent provides
effort in a number of tasks and the principal designs a linear contract, composed by a
variable and a fixed factor, and monitors the effort of the agent. Since the effort in each
task is not contractible, the principal writes an incentive contract contingent on some
public (observable to a third party and contractible) signal non-perfectly correlated
with effort. We present here the benchmark model with two tasks.4
3.1 Benchmark description
This model presents a principal contracting over the non-contractible effort provided
by an agent in two tasks. The agent chooses a vector of efforts t = (t1, t2), which are
not directly observed by the principal. The agent faces a personal cost C(ti ) = 12 t2i for
a level of effort ti in each task i . Since the principal cannot observe the effort provided
in each task, ti , directly (effort in task is not contractible, she may be able to observe
it but there is no third party that can), she writes an incentive contract contingent on
some public (observable to a third party and contractible) signal xi correlated with the
effort ti such that
xi = ti + i for each task i
where i is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2i , and 1 is independent
of 2. The principal designs (assume) a linear contract composed by a variable and
a fixed factor. The agent receives a total compensation of w(X) = β + αT X where
α = (α1, α2)′ is the vector of incentive intensity for each task and X = (x1, x2)′ is a
vector of observable signals about the effort provided by each agent. The agent, with
an absolute coefficient of risk aversion r , has CARA preferences over the total com-
pensation such that u(w) = −e−rw. On the other hand, the principal is risk neutral.
The efforts ti provided by the agent generate a private gross expected profit to the
principal
B(t1, t2) = tθ1 + tθ2 .
This gross expected profit function is flexible enough to provide decreasing, constant
and increasing returns to each task depending on the value of the parameter θ .
4 The case presented here is easily generalizable to the case of n tasks.
123
342 SERIEs (2011) 2:335–358
In this model, unlike the rest of the literature, the principal is able to decide how
much monitoring she wants to do about the effort provided in each task.5 The prin-
cipal would like to observe a signal that reduces all the uncertainty about the effort.
However, the principal faces a technological constraint on monitoring, which is called
attention allocation constraint. The principal is assumed to be endowed with κ units
of monitoring capacity, which needs to allocate to both tasks such that
κ = κ1 + κ2 (1)
where the monitoring technology for each task i is given by σ 2i = 1κφi . The more
attention is allocated to one task, the less uncertainty about the effort provided by
the agent about that particular task. The monitoring technology is flexible enough
to provide decreasing, constant and increasing returns to the attention allocated to a
particular task depending on the value of the parameter φ. This constraint restricts the
amount of information that the principal can process about the efforts that the agent
is providing. This restriction could be interpreted as the principal having a limited
amount of time to concentrate on monitoring the agent. The principal faces a trade-off
between how much monitoring to allocate to each task. The principal cannot allocate
negative attention to any task, which means κi ≥ 0 for any i . The benchmark case
assumes away complementarities between tasks (in both production and monitoring
technologies).
3.2 Model solution
The model is solved using backward induction. First, for a given wage contract (α, β)
and managerial attention allocation, (κ1, κ2), the agent chooses the effort, t , she wants
to provide in each task. Second, given the optimal effort of the agent, the princi-
pal chooses the wage contract for any managerial attention allocation. Third, given
the optimal effort and the optimal wage contract, the principal chooses the optimal
managerial attention allocation.
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), since the contract wage is normally
distributed, the agent’s certainty equivalent can be written by
C E = αT t + β − C(t) − 1
2
rαT α
where  is the diagonal matrix of the vector of error terms in the private signal
(1, 2)
′. For a given wage contract (α, β) and managerial monitoring technology
(κ1, κ2), which implies a given , the agent optimally chooses an effort in each task
that is given as
ti = αi (2)
5 Amount of monitoring in this model can be actual direct monitoring attention or money spent on tech-
nology to monitor a certain task.
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The principal expected profits are given by B(t) − αT μ(t) − β. Since the principal is
risk neutral, she chooses the wage contract and the managerial attention allocation to
maximize the following joint certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their
joint surplus) for an optimal effort provided by the agent
max
{αi ,κi }2i=1
B (t)−C (t)− 1
2
rαT α subject to ti =αi , κ =κ1 + κ2, κ1≥0, κ2≥0
AsHolmstrom andMilgrom (1991) noted, the joint surplus is independent of the inter-
cept β that is used to distribute the joint certainty equivalent between both parties.













as long as θ < 2. If θ ≥ 2, there would be a corner solution with zero or infinite effort.
This is due to the assumption of quadratic costs to effort by the agent and the atten-
tion allocation constraint of the manager. The more attention allocated to one task,
the higher is the incentive intensity the principal offers and the higher the effort the
agent provides on that task. This result shows that the principal has a complementarity
between the attention allocated to a task and the incentive intensity of that task. Since
incentive design and attention allocation are the two tools through which the principal
maximizes profits, this complementarity conditions the decision in each task.
The objective function for the managerial attention allocation optimization prob-
lem given the optimal effort and the optimal wage contract is obtained by plugging
the optimal incentive intensity, α, in Eq. (3) provided by the principal and the optimal
effort, t , provided by the agent in Eq. (2) into the joint certainty equivalent. Once this
is done, the principal’s managerial attention allocation is obtained by maximizing the
























, which is always a strictly positive function as long
as θ < 2.
Proposition 1 The symmetric managerial attention allocation κ1 = κ2 = κ2 is a strict













Proof If we introduce the attention allocation constraint fromEq. (1) into the objective
function in Eq. (4), we obtain the following maximization problem
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The second order condition of this problem when there is a symmetric attention allo-









































Note that through all the paper we are also assuming that θ < 2. unionsq
The inequality condition in Proposition 1 implies that a symmetricmanagerial atten-
tion allocation is optimal when the total monitoring capacity κ is large, the agent’s
degree of risk aversion r is low, the returns to scale in effort θ (in the gross expected
profit function) and the returns to scale in monitoring φ are low (provided the moni-
toring capacity κ is not too large). We explain the intuition behind each one of these
results next.
If the principal is endowed with a large monitoring capacity κ , the attention allo-
cation decision loses relevance since the principal is less attention constrained and
therefore the problem at hand is less of a concern. A second implication from Prop-
osition 1 above is that a lower degree of risk aversion (low r ) implies that the agent
is less sensitive to uncertainty and therefore the principal will have more incentives
to allocate the same attention to both tasks. Our results also predict that the lower
the returns to scale in the expected profits (lower θ ) the larger is the set of parameter
values for which the principal allocates the same amount of monitoring to both tasks.
This is so because the principal’s marginal benefit to accumulating attention in one
task decreases sharply. For this reason, the principal equally motivates both tasks and
therefore allocates the same attention to both tasks. Finally, if there are low returns
to scale in the monitoring technology, low φ, the principal allocates attention to the
effort provided by the agent in both tasks for exactly the same reason as when we have
low returns to scale in production (low θ ).
Corollary 1 The symmetric managerial monitoring attention allocation κ1 = κ2 =
κ
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The left hand side (LHS) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of κ1 for
κ1 ≥ 0 and the right hand side (RHS) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function







Hence, the first order condition equals zero given in Eq. (7) has a unique solution
κ1 = κ2 . The first order conditions are strictly positive for κ1 ∈ [0, κ2 ) and strictly nega-
tive for κ1 ∈ ( κ2 , κ]. The second order condition in Eq. (6) at κ1 = κ2 is always negative.
Therefore, the symmetric managerial monitoring attention allocation κ1 = κ2 = κ2 is
a unique global maximum when the sufficient parameter constraint is satisfied. unionsq
The result of Corollary 1 states that a simple comparison between the returns to
scale in production and monitoring is enough to determine if allocating the same
amount of attention to both tasks, κ1 = κ2 = κ2 , is a global maximum. This condition
establishes that the lower the returns to scale to production, θ , and to monitoring, φ,
the larger is the set of parameter values for which the principal allocates the same
amount of resources to the monitoring of both tasks. The reason follows from our
comments above on the condition in Proposition 1. If the returns to scale in produc-
tion and monitoring are low enough, the marginal benefit to accumulating attention
in any of the tasks and consequently focus production in that task will also be low to
the point that the principal will be better off reallocating some of the attention across
tasks and benefit from an increase in the marginal benefit to attention in both tasks.
Corollary 2 There exist asymmetric managerial monitoring attention allocation equi-













Proof If the constraint is satisfied, the symmetric managerial attention allocation κ1 =
κ2 = κ2 is a strict local minimum. The objective function is a continuous function over
a compact set κ1 ∈ [0, κ], hence there exist a maximum and a minimum. Further-
more, since the objective function in Eq. (5) is a symmetric function around κ1 = κ2 ,
there exits at least two asymmetric equilibria where one type of equilibria is such that
κ1 >
κ
2 > κ2 and the other type of equilibria is such that κ1 <
κ
2 < κ2. unionsq
Finally, the second and last corollary shows that even in our very simple setting
where the tasks enter symmetrically in the principal and agent’s problem, asymmet-
ric attention allocation and incentive provision across tasks can result in equilibrium.
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Mainly, under sufficiently strong increasing returns to scale in production, θ close to
2, or monitoring (as long as the total amount of monitoring capacity κ is not too large),
φ > 1 , the principal optimally concentrates all her monitoring capacity in one task.
This, in turn, strengthens the incentives for that task by increasing α and increasing the
precision in which t is measured. Under our functional assumptions on the monitoring
technology, when the principal decides to allocate no attention to one of the tasks, the
precision of that task decreases radically and therefore the principal is forced to set
α = 0 for the task that is not being monitored. This result would change if we were to
allow for a finite lower bound (similar to the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) frame-
work where  matrix is taken as given). In that case, the optimal incentive contract
would entail α > 0 for all tasks where the value of some α′s would be higher than
others.
This result shows that in scenarios where jobs are defined by a number of differen-
tiated tasks principals may still find optimal to provide unbalanced incentive contracts
even if all tasks that define the job enter the principal’s and the agent’s objective func-
tions symmetrically. Traditional explanations emphasized differences in the contract-
ibility or the returns to scale across tasks as themain reason for observing asymmetries
of incentive provision in these contracts. Here we show that in our model even under
total symmetry among tasks, a principal may find optimal to mute incentives in a task
to strengthen incentives in the other task.6 This result is driven by the main contribu-
tion in this paper, which is to allow the manager to optimally choose how to allocate
her monitoring activities across tasks.7 These monitoring activities have a positive
impact in the productivity of individuals since they increase the precision at which
effort on a given task is measured. Symmetric increasing returns to scale in production
or monitoring increase the set of parameters under which the principal provides an
optimal asymmetric attention allocation across tasks and the consequent unbalanced
provision of incentives.
For expositional purposes we illustrate the inequality of Proposition 1 (and
Corollary 2) in Fig. 1 for an agent with a coefficient of risk aversion, r = 2, and
a principal with three different monitoring capacities, κ = {0.2, 0.5, 1}. The line in
the graph divides the region of parameters where the principal monitors both tasks
from the region of parameters where all the attention is allocated to one of the tasks.
In the region of parameters (φ, θ) above the line, the principal specializes in the mon-
itoring of one of the tasks. Specialization arises if there are increasing returns to scale
either in production or monitoring. It is important to highlight that when there are
decreasing returns to scale in both production and monitoring, the principal always
decides to allocate the same attention to both tasks. Similarly, the figure shows that
neither increasing returns in production nor monitoring are sufficient conditions for
specialization, but only necessary conditions. Finally, see that increasing returns in
6 This result would generalize easily to the case of more than two tasks.
7 It is important to acknowledge that our model relies on functional form assumptions that yield closed
form solutions. Despite this, these functional forms have been used before in the literature. The only novelty
in this paper may be our monitoring technology (which affects output variance around the agent’s effort)
and even the assumption on that functional form is rather innocuous.
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Fig. 1 This figure plots the
combination of parameters
(φ, θ) such that the principal is
indifferent between allocating
monitoring capacity to both
tasks or specializing when the
monitoring capacity is given by
κ = 0.2, 0.5, 1 and the
coefficient of risk aversion is
given by r = 2. Any
combination of parameters
(φ, θ) above the line implies that
the principal specializes in
monitoring one task, while in
any combination of parameters
(φ, θ) below the line, the
principal allocates the same
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both technologies may not be enough since the three lines depicted in Fig. 1 are
bounded away from the Cartesian point (1, 1).
4 Introducing asymmetries between tasks
The benchmark case above assumes symmetry across tasks in the gross expected
profit function and the monitoring technology. In this section, we relax this symmetry
assumption and introduce asymmetries first in the gross expected profit function and
then in the monitoring technology. We aim to understand how sensitive our previous
results are to the symmetry assumption and at the same time examine how our results
compare to traditional results in the incentive contract literature when asymmetries
across tasks exist.
4.1 Asymmetry in the principal’s expected profits
The benchmark model assumes that both tasks provided by the agent generate the
same gross expected profit to the principal. In this section, we show the optimal moni-
toring attention allocation when the tasks generate asymmetric gross expected profits
to the principal. Assume that for the same amount of effort in both tasks, the principal
receives a higher expected profit from the second task such that the gross expected
profits of the principal are given by
B(t1, t2) = tθ1 + τ tθ2 , where τ > 1
The optimal effort decision by the agent is not distorted and is still given by Eq. (2)
from the benchmark model. However, the incentive intensity chosen by the principal
is affected since her gross expected profits have changed. The principal chooses the
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wage contract and the managerial monitoring technology to maximize the following
joint certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their joint surplus) for an





rαT α subject to ti =αi , κ =κ1+κ2, κ1≥0, κ2≥0























as long as θ < 2. The optimal managerial monitoring attention allocation given the
optimal effort and the optimal wage contract by the principal is obtained by plugging
the optimal incentive intensity, (α1, α2), provided by the principal and the optimal
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Proof When we introduce the monitoring attention allocation constraint from Eq. (1)

















The left hand side (LHS) is a strictly increasing function of κ1 for κ1 ≥ 0 and the
right hand side (RHS) is a strictly decreasing function of κ1 for κ1 ≥ 0 if the fol-





> 22−θ . If κ1 = κ2 , the LHS>RHS.
If κ1 = 0, LHS<RHS. Therefore, there exists a unique solution (κ∗1 , κ∗2 ) that makes




2 < κ . The first order conditions are strictly positive
for κ1 ∈ [0, κ∗1 ) and strictly negative for κ1 ∈ (κ∗1 , κ]. The second order condition
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at κ∗1 is always negative. Therefore, the asymmetric managerial monitoring atten-




> 22−θ and τ > 1 are satisfied. unionsq
In this case, the inequality condition inCorollary 3 shows that, due to the asymmetry
in the gross expected profit function, the principal optimally allocates a bigger share
of her monitoring capacity to the task with higher returns as long as both tasks exhibit
the same degree of returns to scale. The incentive strength α placed to different tasks
differs and the principal places α2 > α1 provided that τ > 1. This result is consistent
with the literature in that incentive contracts in multi-tasking settings optimally place
stronger incentives on tasks that are more profitable to the principal.
Similarly to the results in the previous section, it is easy to see that in situations
where the gross expected profit function or the monitoring technology exhibit increas-
ing returns to scale (high θ or φ respectively), the principal chooses to allocate all the
monitoring capacity in task 2(κ2 = κ) and place none in task 1(κ1 = 0). Therefore,
this extreme uneven allocation of attention would mute incentives in task 1(α1 = 0)
andmaximize incentives in task 2(α2 > 0). Again, we find that incentive contracts in a
multi-tasking setting that mute incentives for one task may not come from differences
in returns to effort but be a consequence of the optimal combination of attention allo-
cation across tasks and the optimal provision of incentives. The principal understands
that there is a complementarity between the provision of incentives and the alloca-
tion of attention in each task. In the presence of increasing returns to scale to effort
in the gross expected profit function or in the monitoring technology, the marginal
benefit of accumulating attention on a given task is greater than the marginal benefit
of allocating attention to another task. In this case, the principal chooses to allocate
all her monitoring capacity to a given task and write an optimal incentive contract that
provides incentives to effort on one task only.
4.2 Asymmetry in monitoring technology
Similarly to the case presented above, the benchmark model assumes that monitoring
both tasks cost the same. In this section, we show the optimal monitoring attention
allocation when the tasks have different monitoring costs (due to different technol-
ogies). To proceed with this analysis, we assume that the second task requires more
time of monitoring to reduce the same amount of uncertainty about the non-observable
effort of the agent such that the attention allocation constraint is given by
κ = κ1 + τκ2, where τ > 1 (9)
This constraint does not affect the optimal effort chosen by the agent in the benchmark
model, which is given in Eq. (2), and it does not affect the optimal incentive intensity
provided by the principal and given by Eq. (3) either. However the optimal monitoring
attention allocation is distorted and this leads to our next proposition.









2 when the tasks have different costs of
monitoring (τ > 1) if the following parameter constraint is satisfied
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Proof When we introduce the monitoring attention allocation constraint from Eq. (9)



















where κ2 = (κ−κ1)τ . The left hand side (LHS) is a strictly increasing function of κ1
for κ1 ≥ 0 and the right hand side (RHS) is a strictly decreasing function of κ1 for
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strictly positive for κ1 ∈ [0, κ∗1 ) and strictly negative for κ1 ∈ (κ∗1 , κ]. The second
order condition at κ∗1 is always negative. Therefore, the asymmetric managerial mon-






> 22−θ and τ > 1 are satisfied. unionsq
When we consider the case that task 2 requires more units of monitoring capacity
to increase precision of effort measurement by the same amount (τ > 1), we find that
the principal optimally allocates more attention to task 1 than to task 2 (κ1 > κ2). This
asymmetric allocation of attention comes from the fact that to achieve equal precision
across tasks the principal must allocate more units of attention to task 2 than to task 1.
This means that at the margin the opportunity cost of the last unit of attention allocated
to task 2 in terms of gains in precision of task 1 is higher than the increase in precision
obtained in the measurement of effort exerted in task 2. This unequal trade-off induces
the principal to allocate more units of attention to task 1 up to the point at which the
marginal gain in precision are equal across tasks and κ1 > κ2. At this point, and given
the existing complementarity between attention allocated and incentive provision to
a task, the principal optimally chooses to provide stronger incentives to task 1 than to
task 2(α1 > α2).
This finding is indeed consistent with the main finding in Holmstrom (1979). Opti-
mal incentive contracts mediating a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent
should provide stronger incentives for those tasks that are less costly to monitor.
The novelty here is that the degree of monitorability is endogenous to the principal
and she is able to combine that with the optimal incentive provision scheme.
Finally, and similarly to the previous section, under sufficiently strong increasing
returns to scale in the production function or in the monitoring technology (high θ or
φ respectively), the principal chooses to allocate all her attention to the task where
attention is less costly (task 1 such that κ1 = κ) and allocate no attention to task
2(κ2 = 0). In this case, the principal would offer a contract that offers no incentives
for task 2(α2 = 0) and only provides incentives to task 1(α1 > 0).Wewant to point out
that this corner result hinges on the specific functional assumption on the monitoring
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technology. In other words, there would be a positive provision of incentives to task
2, α2 > 0, if we were to allow for a lower bound of precision.
The introduction of asymmetries in either the principal’s expected profits or moni-
toring technology suggests that small variations in relative prices between tasks might
lead to sharp changes in specialization patterns of firms.We will extend the discussion
about this prediction in Sect. 6, where we discuss the empirical content of the model.
5 Complementarity between tasks
In the general framework above and the particular cases in the following sections,
we assumed away any complementarity between tasks in production and monitor-
ing. Next, we examine the case where the complementarity between tasks exists in
the expected gross profit function, but still assuming away complementarities in the
monitoring technology.
5.1 Complementarity in the production function
The benchmark model assumes that both tasks provided by the agent are independent
of each other in generating gross expected profit to the principal. In this section, we
show the optimal monitoring attention allocation when the tasks have strong comple-
mentarities. Assume that the expected gross profits by the principal are given by
B(t1, t2) = tθ1 tθ2
This expected profit function introduces a strong complementarity between tasks
because if one of the tasks is not provided by the agent, then the principal receives
zero profits. The optimal effort decision by the agent is not distorted and is still given
by Eq. (2) from the benchmark model. However, the incentive intensity chosen by
the principal is affected since her gross expected profits have changed. The principal
chooses the wage contract and the managerial monitoring technology to maximize the
following joint certainty equivalent of the principal and the agent (their joint surplus)
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as long as θ < 1. If θ > 1, the principal could give the agent enough incentives to
choose an infinite effort in both tasks. The optimal managerial monitoring attention
allocation given the optimal effort and the optimal wage contract by the principal is
obtained by plugging the optimal incentive intensity, (α1, α2), provided by the princi-
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, which is always a strictly positive function as long as
θ < 1.
Proposition 2 There is a unique global maximum managerial monitoring attention
allocation with κ1 = κ2 = κ2 .
Proof Whenwe introduce themonitoring attention allocation constraint into the objec-















The right hand side (RHS) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of κ1 for
κ1 ≥ 0 and the left hand side (LHS) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function
of κ1 for κ1 ≥ 0. Hence, the first order condition equals zero has a unique solution
κ1 = κ2 . The first order conditions are strictly positive for κ1 ∈ [0, κ2 ) and strictly
negative for κ1 ∈ ( κ2 , κ]. The second order condition is always negative. Therefore,
the symmetric managerial monitoring attention allocation κ1 = κ2 = κ2 is a unique
global maximum. unionsq
Proposition 2 establishes the result that in the presence of sufficiently strong com-
plementarities it will always be optimal to spread attention allocation across tasks
since the introduction of a strong complementarity in the gross expected profit func-
tion of the principal eliminates the potential benefits of concentrating the principal’s
attention in any given task. In the particular scenario that we examine here, the prin-
cipal optimally allocates equal attention to each task if each task exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. This particular case has an odd but otherwise intuitive result given the
assumptions of the model. If the task exhibit increasing returns to scale (θ > 1) and
the agent’s internal cost of effort is quadratic, there will be no finite solution due to
the complementarity among tasks. The principal benefits from increasing the agent’s
effort more than linearly even after compensating the agent above the cost of her effort.
6 Empirical content of the model and supporting evidence
In this section we review one by one the predictions from our model and comment
on the ideal data set necessary to test these predictions and therefore the empirical
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validity of our model. Since the observation of monitoring practices is a key compo-
nent of our model and traditional data sets lack information on this dimension, we
comment on the resulting biases that emerge when current empirical analysis does not
take into account variation in monitoring intensities across jobs and tasks. We com-
plement this analysis by commenting on evidence in the literature consistent with our
predictions.
As we advance in the previous paragraph, the findings in our model have several
empirical implications that require of information on expenditures in monitoring tech-
nologies to be tested. The ideal data set should detail monitoring practices across firms
as well as across workers and tasks within jobs and firms. This type of information is
scarce since most data sets do not collect information on the intensity of monitoring
within an establishment (plant or firm) and simply limit their inquiries to whether
incentives and monitoring are used at all across the wide variety of jobs and tasks that
take place within an establishment.
To the best of our knowledge, only a few descriptive studies have offered qual-
itative results from settings where managers coordinate incentives and monitoring.
The most clear example that we are able to find in the existing literature is Hueth
et al. (1999) who study contractual relations between growers and distributors in
California fruit and vegetable markets. Hueth et al. (1999) show that market inter-
mediaries coordinate incentives (mainly pay proportional to market price) with field
visits and load measurement.8 Another example is Gittell (2000), a case study that
compares incentives and monitoring practices in American Airlines and Southwest
Airlines. The former airline differs from the latter in that they set stronger individ-
ual incentives along with stronger individual monitoring while Southwest combines
softer (group) incentives with informal peer monitoring. Finally, well-known business
case studies offer rich examples (such as the typist in General Electric) where strong
incentives without strong monitoring are clearly far from optimal.
The main empirical implication of our model is that managers must provide higher
incentives in those tasks that they choose to monitor more closely. This is because of
the complementarity that emerges endogenously within the model between incentives
and monitoring activities through the attention allocation constraint of the principal.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical papers exploiting variation from
large data sets that provide direct evidence of this implication. Ideally we would test
these predictions with a data set that details monitoring and incentives within a firm
across all its workers and jobs for some extended period of time with an exogenous
change in monitoring technology or regulation that impacts the cost of monitoring
workers and tasks during the period of observation.
Despite the lack of information on monitoring, many papers document the rela-
tion between contractibility and incentive provision in agency relationships without
taking into account differences in monitoring practices across firms and jobs. These
papers therefore must implicitly assume a uniform level of monitoring across jobs and
tasks that may bias their empirical estimates of the relation between contractibility and
8 Their paper provides their data in a table and it is easy to show a positive correlation between incentive
provision and the number of field visits and own-measurement practices.
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incentives as well as the relation between incentives and productivity. This omitted
variable econometric problemmust be then biasing their estimates down towards zero.
Take now as example the implications from Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). They
argue that in a regression containing incentive provision as dependent variable and
job characteristics in the right hand side, coefficients are likely to be biased due to
endogenous matching between employees and jobs, that is, a plausible correlation
between the independent variables and the error term. Our paper adds to the empirical
content of Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) in that we show that incentive provision
and job design may be conditioned by the degree of monitoring intensity available
to the principal and therefore part of this unobserved (to the econometrician) cor-
relation between independent variables and the error term may be due to omitted
variables such as monitoring technologies and monitoring effort that are endogenous
and simultaneously determined with incentives and job characteristics. Having data
on the principal’s allocation of monitoring to different jobs and tasks may help with
the endogeneity problem at hand.
It is important to note though that our implications predict estimates biased toward
zero due to the presence of omitted variables while Ackerberg and Botticini (2002)
predict a positive bias due to self-selection of employees into their most adequate jobs.
Therefore it is difficult to know ex-ante in which direction the net bias will go.
On the other hand, our results show that under strong complementarities across
tasks it will always be optimal to balance incentives and attention across tasks. How-
ever, when tasks are independent, the principal may optimally choose to offer an
unbalanced incentive provision (and attention allocation) across tasks. An extreme
result from our model is that under increasing returns to scale in the production or
monitoring technology the principal may mute incentives in some relevant tasks (to
their profit function) and focus their monitoring and incentives in a subset of tasks
that define a job. Therefore, another way to test the implications of our model would
be to observe monitoring activities across tasks before and after an employer decides
to mute incentives in some tasks and increase them in others. A positive correlation
between incentives and monitoring activities for a given task within a contract would
be consistent with the testable implications in our model. We may find consistent evi-
dence (not definite tests though) in papers that studied contracts muting incentives for
some of the tasks defining jobs (see Chiappori and Salanie 2003 for a list of a few
examples).
Similarly, our model predicts that monitoring and incentives in all tasks will move
in the same direction as long as the total amount of attention increases. Otherwise,
our model assumes that incentives and monitoring across tasks within a job should be
negatively correlated. For example, the adoption of on-board computers (OBC here-
after) in trucking, as studied in Baker and Hubbard (2003), may have lowered the cost
of monitoring across all tasks and therefore increased the total attention capacity. In
that case, our model would predict an increase in incentives across all tasks. If the
adoption of OBC had lowered monitoring costs in only a few tasks within a job (driv-
ing routes versus truck maintenance) our predictions would indicate that incentives
in those tasks affected by OBC adoption may increase and incentives in other tasks
may decrease. Finally, if different firms specialized in different services and there-
fore jobs differ in their task composition across firms, the introduction of OBC may
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increase incentives more sharply in those firms where jobs are composed by fewer
tasks. Unfortunately, these predictions are not testable with the data set used in Baker
and Hubbard (2003) since monitoring and incentive information at the job and task
level are not available.
A last set of prediction comes from results in Sect. 4 which suggest that, in the case
of increasing returns, one could see sharp changes in specialization patterns within
companies for relatively small changes in prices of output for different tasks. To test
this prediction, the empirical researcher would need a data set containing information
on incentives and monitoring intensities across a set of firms within an industry and
observe a change in the relative output price of different tasks. Our model specifically
predicts that specialization of the firms in the data set would happen at the same time
that the intensity of both incentives and monitoring increased for those tasks that the
firm is choosing to specialize into. A classical example consistent with this prediction
is the pin factory of Adams Smith and the relevance of market size for the extent of
the division of labor. As market size increases, the gains of worker specialization in
either task increases and therefore the relative output price increases (away from 1 in
our model). According to Smith, this moves pin factories to reorganize their workers
into more specialized jobs and therefore only reward them for their performance in a
subset of the tasks that they carried before. Smith’s accounting failed to provide us
with information on the changes in monitoring that came along specialization in pin
factories located in larger markets and therefore we cannot test whether our model is
relevant in that context.
Our other empirical implications are also consistent with other stylized facts in the
existing literature. Other papers have documented cases when the cost of monitoring
has gone down due to an exogenous factor such as a change in technology. As men-
tioned above, Baker and Hubbard (2003) show that the introduction of OBC lowered
the costs of monitoring (and presumably the amount of monitoring increased) in the
trucking industry and increased the amount of outsourcing with high-powered incen-
tives for certain types of hauls. If attention allocated to a task is correlated with the
level of investment in monitoring technology in that particular task, their results are
consistent with our testable implications. In another paper, Lerner and Malmendier
(2008) study the relation between contractibility and the design of contracts in bio-
technology research. In their setting, financing firms worry that research firms use
their funding to pursue side projects. They find that when actions are not contractible
an option contract becomes optimal since the threat of termination strengthens the
incentives of the research firm. Finally, we find more supporting evidence in Slade
(1996) who empirically examines contracts between private, integrated oil companies
and their service stations in Vancouver. She shows that variation in characteristics
of a task (possibly correlated with contractibility) optimally changes compensation
scheme for other tasks.
All of these papers offer evidence that indirectly support our results in that a
quasi-exogenous shock in the cost of monitoring (a change in the monitoring technol-
ogy) affects the contracting scenario and changes the strength of incentives optimally
offered. Despite this, there is no direct evidence relating information on monitoring
practices (at firm, job or task level) with incentive provision, and therefore there is not
yet a direct test of our model.
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduce managerial attention allocation in optimal incentive con-
tracts by extending the model in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). In our model,
managers are constrained in the total amount of monitoring capacity that they can
allocate across tasks. The allocation of attention across tasks becomes a managerial
problem with clearly defined trade-offs. Specifically, more attention allocated to one
task implies less monitoring in other tasks. When managers allocate more attention to
a given task, the worker’s effort on that task becomes more contractible and therefore
themanager optimally provides stronger incentives on the realization of that same task.
We find that managers allocate the same level of attention and provide the
same incentives for both tasks when production and monitoring technologies exhibit
decreasing returns to scale.When relaxing these initial conditions and allowing for the
presence of increasing returns for both tasks in either production or monitoring, the
symmetry of the results disappears and we find that managers may optimally concen-
trate all their attention and provide incentives only for one of the tasks. After that, we
introduce asymmetries in the way different tasks enter the production and monitoring
technologies. As a result of this asymmetry, we find that managers optimally allocate
different amounts of attention to different tasks and provide different incentives to
different tasks.
These findings provide an alternative and complementary explanation for the use
of simple unidimensional contracts in multi-tasking settings. In cases when manag-
ers can act upon and change their monitoring activities (through direct monitoring or
investment in new monitoring technologies), they may coordinate their attention allo-
cation decisions and incentive contracts. In particular, they may choose to concentrate
all their attention and incentives in a few tasks and leave some others unmentioned in
the contracts at use. This result from our model is consistent with the fact that most
jobs are multidimensional and yet managers and principals use simple contracts that
concentrate in only a few of the tasks that compose the job.
A straightforward extension of the model at hand would be to generalize the case
of two tasks presented here into n tasks. We believe though that our main results will
not change qualitatively, and we foresee that the analysis and testable implications
presented in this paper are easily generalizable and that they do not change when the
number of tasks defining the job increases. Another possible extension is to adopt
other forms of monitoring technologies that resemble more closely the monitoring
tools that managers have available. Future lines of research are to include comple-
mentarities between tasks in monitoring and study the implications of managerial
attention allocation for other incentive problems and vertical integration decisions.
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